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
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ANALECTA
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AERE PERENNIUS

Mélanges égyptologiques en l'honneur
de Pascal Vernus

édités par

PHILIPPE COLLOMBERT, DOMINIQUE LEFÈVRE,
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PRAGMATIC IMPLICATION AND CONDITIONALS WITH THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE IN LATE EGYPTIAN

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Résumé. Analyse du rôle de l'obversion (complète ou partielle), un type d'inférence pragmatique affectant la signification des conditionnelles en néo-égyptien. Cette étude se concentre sur les constructions recourant au futur III négatif.

Abstract. A discussion of the role of implicated full and partial obversion in reading Late Egyptian conditionals. The paper centres on conditionals displaying the negative third future.

1. INTRODUCTION

Part of what has been most distinctive and significant about the work of Pascal Vernus has been the close regard he has had for meaning in Ancient Egyptian, as well as form. It is a considerable pleasure to be able to offer a paper to celebrate him and his work, and I hope that the following paper, with its investigation of meaning in conditionals in Late Egyptian, will be of interest to him.

In order to take an article-sized slice through conditional expression and usage in Late Egyptian, I limit the range of this paper primarily to conditionals containing explicit examples of the negative third future tense (*bn iw.f r sdm*), a form which is uncontentious in its identification, along with certain other relevant examples with the affirmative third future to clarify points raised. I will also restrict myself primarily (though again not exclusively) to late Twentieth Dynasty texts (principally the tomb robbery papyri and other late Ramesside documents). I should stress from the outset that I am using examples with the negative third future simply as a means to discuss certain aspects of the meaning (particularly pragmatic implications) of Late Egyptian conditionals and not as an opportunity to discuss the occurrence or meaning of the negative third future itself.

2. THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE

IN THE ANTECEDENT CLAUSE OF THE *inn* CONDITIONAL

The key example for the appearance of the negative third future in the antecedent clause of *inn* conditionals comes from pMayer B:

Ex. 1 pMayer B, ll. 4–5 (= *KRI* VI, 515,10-12)

Pais attempts to coerce his way into a share of the proceeds of a robbery:

ir n3 ḥd i-gm.k inn bn iw.k dit n.i im.w iw.i šm r dd.f n3 p3 ḥ3ty-ꜥ n imnt n3 3tw

“as for the monies which you have found, if you are not going to give me (anything) from them, I am going to go to tell of it (to) the people of the governor of the west and the inspectors”¹

This is a conditional threat. The threat is presented in the consequent (the threat to report the thefts to the authorities), but the activation or cancellation of the threat is treated as being reliant on the trigger, or enabling factor, of whether or not the antecedent condition reflects the intentions of the hearer. Conditional threats have the following attributes:²

- 1) The antecedent is undesirable for the speaker³
- 2) The hearer has control over whether the antecedent is realised or not
- 3) The speaker wants the hearer not to realise the antecedent
- 4) The speaker considers the consequent undesirable for the hearer
- 5) The speaker has control over the realisation of the consequent

This meets the properties of the Late Egyptian conditional in ex. 1 nicely:

- 1) The antecedent-condition of not being given a share from the thefts is clearly undesirable to the speaker (he wants to be given the money)

¹ For the intentional or volitional sense of the negative third future here, see St. Polis, “Les relations entre futur et modalité déontique. À propos des sens du futur III en néo-égyptien”, *LingAeg* 14 (2006), p. 240-244, with pMayer B, ll. 4-5 as ex. 27 (p. 242). For the marking of the condition with *inn*, see M. Collier, “The Lure of Alterity: *inn* Conditionals in Late Egyptian”, *LingAeg* 14 (2006), p. 181-198 with pMayer B, ll. 4-5 as ex. 20 (p. 193) and M. Collier, “Conditionals in Late Egyptian”, in E. Grossman, M. Haspelmath & T.S. Richter (eds.), *Egyptian-Coptic Linguistics in Typological Perspective* (forthcoming), section 2.

² Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, “Conditionals and Types of Conditional Perfection”, *Journal of Pragmatics* 40 (2008), p. 357-358.

³ Simply for terminological consistency, I will use the terms “speaker” and “hearer” (in the singular) throughout to represent the main parties in the conditional exchange.

- 2) The hearer has control currently over whether the speaker is given a share or not (though is being coerced here into considering giving Pais a share)
- 3) The speaker wants the hearer to give him a share in the money (negation cancellation of [if you not-not give me a share])
- 4) The speaker considers his going to report the matter to higher authorities to be undesirable for the hearer
- 5) The speaker has control over the consequent action of going to report the matter to higher authorities.

The conditional presents two alternatives, one explicitly stated and the other, its obverse, pragmatically implicated (an invited inference).⁴ The conditional as actually expressed conveys an undesirable state of affairs for both the speaker (antecedent) and hearer (consequent) and links the two together conditionally.⁵

A: [you not give me a share] → [I report thefts to higher authorities]

The implicated obverse of this presents the alternate in which the realisation of the desirable state of affairs for the speaker leads to the realisation of the desirable state of affairs for the hearer, an obverse relationship which is consistent with the explicit conditional in context:

If you are going to give me something from them, I will not go to tell of it to the people of the governor of the west and the inspectors.

B: [you give me a share] → [I not report thefts to higher authorities]

This implicated obverse offers the hearer the opportunity to head off the threat by giving Pais access to a share (whether this had been intended all along or is a response to Pais's threat). And, indeed, this is what happens: the unnamed speaker goes on to state that the thieves coaxed Pais round from his threat by promising to take him to the tomb (of Ramesses VI) so that he could get a share for himself (pMayer B, ll. 5-6). A few days later they do indeed take Pais to the tomb (pMayer B, ll. 6ff.). So it is this implied obverse-alternate which actually guides events, since the hearers act on this alternate and give Pais access to a share (and clearly expect, in return, that he will not report the thefts). Notice, however, that this action is not directly taken in relation to the conditional as actually stated but is directly taken in relation to the

⁴ For the practical/pragmatic reasoning in such conditional perfection readings (as opposed to logically valid deduction), see L.R. Horn, "From *If* to *If*ff: Conditional Perfection as Pragmatic Strengthening", *Journal of Pragmatics* 32 (2000), p. 289-326.

⁵ For a discussion of desirability/undesirability in conditionals see, for example, N. Akatsuka, "Negative Conditionality, Subjectification and Conditional Reasoning", in A. Athanasiadou & R. Dirven (eds.), *On Conditionals Again (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 143)*, 1997, p. 323-354.

unstated but implicated obverse relationship retrieved by the hearers through pragmatic interpretation (seemingly the same to both ancient hearers and modern readers).⁶

The implicated obversion in ex. 1 affects both the antecedent and consequent clauses in the conditional: [-antecedent] \rightarrow [-consequent]. I shall refer to this as the implicated full obverse (IFO).⁷

In the specific context of the interaction between the two parties, the following two implications do not seem to be appropriate and seem to be inconsistent in practice with the conditional as stated (A). The first is:

C: *[you give me a share] \rightarrow [I report thefts to higher authorities]

with the antecedent obversed [-antecedent] but the consequent as stated [+consequent], a relationship which would scarcely appeal to the hearer in this case.⁸ If this implication were as readily entertained here as B, then the hearer would scarcely be readily coerced into giving Pais a share without significant additional discussion as to Pais's intended actions. As will be discussed below, whether implication B or C is treated as being consistent in context with the conditional as stated (A) is often a key element in reading a conditional in context. The second is:

D: *[you not give me a share] \rightarrow [I not report thefts to higher authorities]

with the antecedent as in the stated conditional [+antecedent] but the consequent obversed [-consequent]. Clearly if the antecedent is (taken to be) true ([you are not going to give me a share]), then the obversed consequent in D is contradictory to the stated consequent in the

⁶ In addition there is a biconditional exclusivising strengthening ('only'), resulting from taking A and B together. Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, *Journal of Pragmatics* 40 (2008), p. 357-358 argue for an "only if not-p, not-q" biconditional reading for conditional threats: "only if you are going to give me a share will I not report the thefts to higher authorities", equivalent to "I will report it to higher authorities unless you give me a share", or perhaps to paraphrase: "I'm prepared to report it to higher authorities unless you give me a share". In contrast, the strengthening is usually taken to be of the "only if p, q" type: "only if you do not give me a share will I report you".

⁷ For further discussion of obversion in Late Egyptian conditionals, specifically counterfactual conditionals, see M. Collier, "Late Egyptian Counterfactual Conditionals and Counterfactual Reasoning", to appear in a forthcoming *Festschrift*.

⁸ Indicating that the conditional in ex. 1 is not to be interpreted (nor is taken by the ancient participants) as strictly equivalent to the material conditional of logic, for, in that case, interpretation C too should be taken as being consistent with the stated conditional in ex. 1. However, in terms of human interaction as displayed in the co(n)text, interpretation C is not one which either party seems to entertain seriously in practice (rather the conditional is given the biconditional interpretation discussed here).

conditional as expressed (A): [I will not report the thefts] is plainly in contradiction to [I will report the thefts] and there is no threat.⁹

I shall utilise the labels assigned above (A-D) in order to discuss antecedent-consequent implications, here given schematically:¹⁰

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[+antecedent]	[+consequent]
B	[-antecedent]	[-consequent]
C	[-antecedent]	[+consequent]
D	[+antecedent]	[-consequent]

Tab. 1. Table of antecedent-consequent relations A-D

On this basis, a table of appropriate and inappropriate pragmatic implications can be drawn up for ex. 1 (grey background indicates inappropriate pragmatic implications, leaving the appropriate pragmatic implications without background):

	Antecedent	Consequent	
A	[you not give me a share]	[I report thefts to authorities]	undesirable
B	[you give me a share]	[I not report thefts to authorities]	desirable
C	[you give me a share]	[I report thefts to authorities]	
D	[you not give me a share]	[I not report thefts to authorities]	

Tab. 2. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pMayer B, ll. 4-5

The pragmatic effect is a quite general one and not restricted to examples with an explicit negation in the antecedent; indeed implicated full obversion (B) is the more commonly attested pattern for implicated obversion with conditionals (whether marked with *ir iw*, *inn* or *h-n*). The following provides an example of a conditional with *inn* + affirmative third future antecedent with implicated full obverse interpretation:

- Ex. 2 pBM EA 10052, vs. 12, l. 18 (= *KRI* VI, 794,8-9)
 Dutemheb is being interrogated. He claims not to have seen anything. After being beaten again, he says, “I didn’t see anything”:
inn iw.k ḏd i-g? g?y.i
 “if you will (just) say ‘lie’, then I will lie”¹¹

⁹ In truth-conditional terms, this is the combination of true antecedent and false consequent which produces a false conditional and thus one inconsistent with A.

¹⁰ This mimics, of course, the standard truth table in logic for the conditional operator.

¹¹ For the volitional sense, again see St. Polis, *LingAeg* 14 (2006), p. 240-244.

This example reflects nicely both the full implicated obverse and the combination of the explicit conditional and the full implicated obverse to produce a biconditional reading (“conditional perfection”) strengthening the exclusivity of the antecedent for the consequent (with the sense of “I won’t lie unless you tell me to”):

- IFO: if you will not say “lie” [= say “Don’t lie”], then I won’t lie
- Bic: only if you will say “lie” will I lie

The antecedent seems to be treated by the speaker as undesirable to the hearer (and indeed the speaker) and is under the control of the hearer; the consequent is presented as also undesirable to the hearer and the speaker and is under the direct control of the speaker. As such, the speaker is indicating how the hearer might guide the speaker’s actions, presumably on the basis that the hearer should not want the speaker to behave in this way. Notice that, as with ex. 1, the alternate desirable state of affairs [you not tell me to lie] → [I not lie] is again merely implicated. As with ex. 1, this can be presented in a table along with the inappropriate C and D interpretations:

	Antecedent	Consequent	
A	[you tell me to lie]	[I lie]	undesirable
B	[you not tell me to lie]	[I not lie]	desirable
C	[you not tell me to lie]	[I lie]	
D	[you tell me to lie]	[I not lie]	

Tab. 3. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pBM EA10052, 12, l. 18

It is noticeable that this example provides another instance of the “[you do something] leads-to [me doing something]” type of conditional (an interactional conditional) in which actions of the interlocutor are presented as providing (enabling or trigger) conditions for actions of the speaker, a regular part of human interaction and negotiation.

The tomb robbery papyri also provide two nice examples of conditionals with *inn* + affirmative third future antecedents which allow only for an implicated partial obverse (IPO) reading:

- Ex. 3 pBM EA 10052, vs. 8, l. 5 (= *KRI* VI, 785,15-16)
Sekhahatyamun is being interrogated. His initial response is to claim that he had nothing to do with the thefts from tombs at Thebes. He does, however, confess to involvement in other robberies:

inn iw.tw hdb.i hr n3 (m)h^c n iw-(m)-itrw ntw n3 wn.i im
 “if I am going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, then (at least) they are the ones I’ve been in”

- Ex. 4 pBM EA 10052, vs. 11, l. 12 (= KRI VI, 791,14)
 Ankhefenamun is being interrogated. He claims to have had nothing to do with the theft and to know nothing of any tombs which the men in his charge may have been in:
inn iw.tw hdb(.i) hr rmt ntf t3y.i t3w
 “if I am going to be killed because of someone (else), then my theft/crime is (really) his”

In both of these examples the consequent holds (or not) regardless of whether or not the situation in the antecedent comes to pass¹² — the consequent is entailed by the conditional and is not dependent for its truth (or falsity) on the antecedent. The implications are:

- IFO: *If I am not going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, then these are not the ones I have been in.
 IPO: If I am not going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, then these are (still) the ones I have been in.
 IFO: *If I am not going to be killed because of someone (else), then my crime is not his
 IPO: If I am not going to be killed because of someone (else), then my crime is (still) his.

It is noticeable that both examples have nominal sentence consequents (and so do not refer to dynamic actions) and the consequents have their immediate realisation or force in the utterance of the conditional. As such the consequent does not provide a consequential outcome awaiting the realisation or non-realisation of the event in the antecedent but rather provides a comment on the situation the speaker finds himself in and, in particular, the attributed cause for his being killed (acceptance in ex. 3, denial in ex. 4). Insofar as there is an enabling chain here, the conditionals in exx. 3 and 4 do not refer to a sequence of real-world content: the two men actually being killed for the reasons stated does not, of course, lead to one of them having been in those tombs or the other to being mistakenly accused. Rather, knowledge/awareness of the situations depicted in the explicit antecedent motivates (triggers) them to

¹² This can be reflected in an extended paraphrase: “If I am going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, and even if I am not going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, these are the ones I have been in” and “If I am going to be killed because of someone else, and even if I am not going to be killed because of someone else, my crime is his”.

deliver their comments on that antecedent situation.¹³ The pragmatic implication relationships can be tabulated in terms of antecedent-consequent relations as follows:

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[I to be killed because of Iumitru tombs]	[these are the ones I was in]
B	[I not to be killed because of Iumitru tombs]	[these are not the ones I was in]
C	[I not to be killed because of Iumitru tombs]	[these are the ones I was in]
D	[I to be killed because of Iumitru tombs]	[these are not the ones I was in]

Tab. 4. Table of antecedent/consequent relations for pBM EA10052, 8, l. 5

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[I to be killed because of someone else]	[my crime is his]
B	[I not to be killed because of someone else]	[my crime is not his]
C	[I not to be killed because of someone else]	[my crime is his]
D	[I to be killed because of someone else]	[my crime is not his]

Tab. 5. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pBM EA10052, 11, l. 12

3. THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE
IN THE CONSEQUENT CLAUSE OF THE *ir iw* CONDITIONAL

And so on to three examples of the negative third future in the consequent clause of *ir iw* conditionals:¹⁴

- Ex. 5 pBM EA 10416 vs., ll. 11-12 (= J. Janssen, *Late Ramesside Letters and Communications* [HPBM 6], 1991, pl. 17, ll. 11-12)
A woman who has been sleeping with a man who is not her husband is under threat of violence. A steward has restrained those threatening violence once, but writes to the woman, pointing out the following:

¹³ On conditionals of this type not licensing conditional perfection inferences, cf. L.R. Horn, *Journal of Pragmatics* 32 (2000), p. 317-318 and Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, *Journal of Pragmatics* 40 (2008), p. 365-366.

¹⁴ There is an example of the negative third future in the antecedent clause of an *ir iw* conditional from pBM EA 10418+10287 rt., ll. 3-5 (= J. Janssen, *LRLC*, pl. 19): *ir iw bn iw.n gmt.s r knkn.s iw.n gm rt3 t3y.s snt šri*. However, this short communiqué lacks sufficient context to feel confident about the nuance conveyed by the tense selection.

y3 ir iw i[n]ty(.i) sn m p3y sp bn iw.i inty.w m ky

“actually, (even) if I have restrained them this time, I won’t (be able to) restrain them another (time)”

- Ex. 6 pBiblNat 198II (LRL no. 46) vs., ll. 6-7 (= J. Černý, *Late Ramesside Letters* [BiAeg 9], 1939, p. 68, 9-10 [= LRL])

The letter writer shows, as he has done regularly through his letter, his disgruntlement with the intended recipient:

ir iw.k m t3ty bn iw.i h3y r n3y.k skty

“(even) if you were the vizier, I wouldn’t get into your boats”

- Ex. 7 pBM EA 10052, rt. 1, ll. 19-21 (= KRI VI, 769,2-5)

The scribe of the necropolis Nesamenope challenges Bukhaaf’s account of the robberies:

ir iw.i šm mtw.i t3w w^c hn n ʿnh m w^c ih(y) mtw ky šm (m-)s3.i bn iw.i smtr.f r dit dmi n.f sb3[yt] i-r-m.i

“if I were to go and take a goatskin from a stall and another went in following me, I would not denounce him (just) to make the punishment fall on him along with me”

The first two examples (exx. 5 and 6) can readily be read as (scalar) concessive conditionals. I have already discussed the properties of concessive conditionals in building an implicated scalar set of conditions in which the stated antecedent is a limiting condition.¹⁵ As such, and as is well known,¹⁶ these conditionals are not subject to implicated full obversion. Rather the obverse to the antecedent takes its place among the inclusive set of conditions (explicit and implicated), along with other pragmatically relevant conditions (which are to be accessed for specific meaning in context). The stated consequent then applies to the set of conditions, and thus such conditionals display implicated partial obversion (here contrasted with the inappropriateness of implicated full obversion):

IFO: *If I had not restrained them this time, I would be able to restrain them another (time)

IPO: If I had not restrained them this time, I (still/certainly) wouldn’t be able to restrain them another (time).¹⁷

¹⁵ See M. Collier, “Pragmatics and Meaning Construction in Late Egyptian: Of Implicatures, Pragmatic Scales, and Scope”, *LingAeg* 17 (2009), p. 15-17 and “Late Egyptian Counterfactual Conditionals” (forthcoming *Festschrift*).

¹⁶ See, for example, E. König, “Conditionals, Concessive Conditionals and Concessives: Areas of Contrast, Overlap and Neutralization”, in E.C. Traugott, A. ter Meulen, J. Snitzer Reilly & Ch.A. Ferguson (eds.), *On Conditionals*, 1986, p. 236; L.R. Horn, *Journal of Pragmatics* 32 (2000), p. 318; Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, *Journal of Pragmatics* 40 (2008), p. 367.

¹⁷ Inference C would be counterfactual, but this still bolsters the point that the speaker is making that in any event, including the stated circumstance of being able to

- IFO: *If you were not the Vizier, I would get into your boats
- IPO: If you were not the Vizier, I would (still/certainly) not get into
 your boats

In ex. 5 the antecedent was presumably desirable to the hearer, the speaker had control over it and the hearer presumably wanted the speaker to do it (the speaker restrained the mob). The conditional, however, points out that the speaker will not be able to repeat this. As such the speaker is heading off what may be (being modelled as) an expectation/assumption in the context (she can't rely on this again):

[I restrain them this time] → [I restrain them another]

This, of course, is the D inference inconsistent with the conditional as stated (through contradictory consequents in the context of a true antecedent) and so the conditional is used to exclude this inference pragmatically (him restraining them this time will not lead to him being able to restrain them next time):

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[I restrain them this time]	[I not restrain them another time]
B	[I not restrain them this time]	[I restrain them another time]
C	[I not restrain them this time]	[I not restrain them another time]
D	[I restrain them this time]	[I restrain them another time]

Tab. 6. Table of antecedent-consequent relations
for pBM EA10416 vs., ll. 11-12

Ex. 6 can be read in a similar manner. The speaker presents the hypothetical limiting condition of the hearer holding the position of Vizier and states that he would not go along with him even in such a circumstance, and so, by implication, not in any circumstance lower in the scale (including one in which the hearer has the status he actually has). Through deploying the concessive conditional, the speaker thus heads off the modelled possibility that he might be taken to follow along with the hearer: the D interpretation inconsistent with the conditional as stated (A):

[you as Vizier] → [I get into your boats]

restrain them this time or the counterfactual situation of him not having been able to do so, he will not be able to do so again. The implicated counterfactual provides a less extreme case and so strengthens the sense of the stated antecedent as a limiting condition.

By scalar ranking and counterpart matching this also excludes the B interpretation (the hearer in his actual status is, of course, a more pragmatically salient condition within the included set than just the general obverse situation of him not being the Vizier):

[you as not Vizier (incl. you as you)] → [I get into your boats]

Again this can be tabulated as follows:

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[you as Vizier]	[I not get into your boats]
B	[you not as Vizier (incl. you as you)]	[I get into your boats]
C	[you not as Vizier (incl. you as you)]	[I not get into your boats]
D	[you as Vizier]	[I get into your boats]

Tab. 7. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pBiblNat 198II vs., ll. 6-7

Ex. 7 is not as clear in its full nuance.¹⁸ It seems to present an imaginary analogy in the antecedent (rather like ex. 6, but this time reflecting perhaps an imaginary case as a distillation of properties akin to the real context rather than a scale ranging over the imaginary context and the real context) and then a comment by the speaker on how the speaker would act in this situation (presumably to be compared to the actions of the hearer). Taking this reading, then the implicated obversions are (I assign negation minimally to the antecedent for sense):

IFO: *if I were to go and didn't take a goatskin from a stall and another went in following me, I would denounce him (just) to make the punishment fall on him along with me

IPO: if I were to go and didn't take a goatskin from a stall and another went in following me, I would not denounce him (just) to make the punishment fall on him along with me

Of course, the relevance of the IPO reading is rather low:¹⁹ once the antecedent condition is negated (and effectively cancelled) there is little relevance in context in invoking the consequent at all (though the invoked consequent would still be that of the explicit conditional). The more pragmatically salient comparison is the assumed similarity

¹⁸ For example, the consequent is taken as a flexion question by D. Sweeney, *Correspondence and Dialogue: Pragmatic Factors in Late Ramesside Letter-Writing* (ÄAT 49), 2001, p. 111, ex. 13, and thus read with a rather different nuance in detail.

¹⁹ Cf. Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, *Journal of Pragmatics* 40 (2008), p. 362-365.

between the stated antecedent situation and Bukhaaf’s situation (which is, technically, not an act of taking a goatskin), and the speaker’s application of the consequent across both situations, imaginary and real. If this reading is the intended reading (I note again the possibility of a flexion question reading of the consequent), then the conditional would seem to be excluding an antecedent-consequent relationship which would be intended to be analogous to Bukhaaf’s account:

[I take goatskin and another follows]
→ [I denounce him for punishment]

Once again, this would be the D implication:

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[I take goatskin and another follows]	[I not denounce him for punishment]
B	[I not take goatskin and another follows]	[I denounce him for punishment]
C	[I not take goatskin and another follows]	[I not denounce him for punishment]
D	[I take goatskin and another follows]	[I denounce him for punishment]

Tab. 8. Table of antecedent-consequent relations
for pBM EA 10052, rt. 1, ll. 19-21

Of course, *ir iw* conditionals also occur displaying implicated full obversion. For example, the Late Ramesside Letters provide a clear late Twentieth Dynasty writing of the affirmative third future, with written *r*, in the consequent clause of an *ir iw* conditional:

Ex. 8 pBM EA 75019+10302 vs., l. 4 (= R.J. Demarée, *The Bankes Late Ramesside Papyri* [BMRP 155], 2006, pl. 16, l. 4)
The sender of the letter is discussing certain items which the addressee has not had delivered. The sender refers to an earlier letter in which the addressee had said:
ir iw.k h3b ʕn iw.i r dit in.tw n.k
“If you write again, I will have them sent to you”

This example displays implicated full obversion, as well as a biconditional reading (resulting from the combination of explicit and implicated alternates) indicating that having the items sent requires the original addressee specifically to write back to request them (which he is now doing):

IFO: If you don’t write again, I will not have them sent to you
Bic: Only if you write again will I have them sent to you

This is another example of an interactional conditional of the “[you do something] leads-to [me doing something]” type. In this example, the antecedent of the stated conditional is desired by the speaker, but the hearer has control over it, whereas the consequent is desired by the hearer but under the control of the speaker. Unlike ex. 1, it is the more desirable relationship which is presented as the explicitly stated conditional and provides the relationship which is acted upon:

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[You write to me again]	[I have goods sent to you]
B	[You not write to me again]	[I not have goods sent to you]
C	[You not write to me again]	[I have goods sent to you]
D	[You write to me again]	[I not have goods sent to you]

Tab. 9. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pBM EA 75019+10302 vs., l. 4

4. THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE AFTER *wn* IN THE CONSEQUENT CLAUSE OF THE *h-n* CONDITIONAL

The late Twentieth Dynasty material does not supply us with an example of the negative third future in a *h-n* conditional. However, a good example occurs in *Wenamun*:

Ex. 9 *Wenamun*, 2, ll. 28-30 (= A.H. Gardiner, *Late Egyptian Stories* [*BiAeg* 1], 1932, p. 69, l. 14-16)

Wenamun directly exploits Tjekerbaal's argument to reconfigure his own:

*ir p3y.k dd wn n3 nsy h3wty dit in.tw hq nbw h-n wn (m)-di.w ʕnh
snb wn bn iw.w dit in.tw n3 (3)ht*

“as for your saying that previous kings used to have silver and gold sent, if they had had life and health, they would not have had these things sent”

The counterfactual licenses implicated full obversion (IFO = B):

IFO: if they had not had life and health, they would have had these things sent

and, as is clear from the context, this is treated by Wenamun as reflecting the actual state of affairs, as picked up in the following sentence in the text: *Wen.* 2, l. 30: *i-ir.w dit in.tw n3 3ht (r)-db3 ʕnh snb n3y.f ity* “they did send these things, but instead of life and health, to your ancestors”. In contrast, implications C and D are not appropriate:

- C: if they had not had life and health, they would not have had these things sent
- D: if they had had life and health, they would have had these things sent

In table form:

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[they have life and health]	[they not send silver and gold]
B	[they not have life and health]	[they send silver and gold]
C	[they not have life and health]	[they not send silver and gold]
D	[they have life and health]	[they send silver and gold]

Tab. 10. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for *Wenamun*, 2, ll. 20-30

Note that the presence of the negative third future in the consequent of this example showing implicated full obversion indicates that, whilst negation plays a significant role in the implicated partial obverse inferences discussed for the negative third future consequents in exx. 5-7 above, this inference is not produced simply as a consequence of the presence of explicit negation in the consequent.²⁰

5. THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE
IN THE CONSEQUENT CLAUSE OF THE *inn* CONDITIONAL

Finally, and to turn nearly full circle, an example with a negative third future in the consequent of an *inn* conditional:

- Ex. 10 pBiblNat 198III (*LRL* no. 47) vs., ll. 3-4 (= *LRL* 69,15-16)
The sender (possibly Dhutmose) complains about the apparent failure of the recipient to carry out a particular task assigned to him, including failure to heed the instruction (previously given by the sender) to dispatch staff to get grain to supply men he has working for him. Having reiterated his complaint that the recipient just doesn't seem to listen, he goes on to comment with the following conditional and then reiterates the key element of his instruction to send staff to get grain:
inn n3y.k shnw ʕš3 r.k bn iw.k rh šm m p3y shn n pr-ʕ3 ʕ.w.s.
“if your assignments are too much for you, then you will not be able to carry out this (particular) assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h.”

²⁰ For fuller discussion of this example, with focus on its counterfactual status and the reasoning patterns it invokes, see M. Collier, “Late Egyptian Counterfactual Conditionals and Counterfactual Reasoning” (forthcoming *Festschrift*), ex. 1 with discussion.

As so often, the particular sense of this conditional turns on the exact sense of a key phrase, in this case the sense of *šm m*, which has been usually taken to mean “carry out, proceed with”,²¹ but also to “get out of”.²² The “carrying out” sense seems more appropriate and so is taken here.

The conditional taken in this sense²³ has a straightforward IFO inference (particularly with the deontic expectative sense “you (really) should be able to”):

- B: if your assignments are not too much for you, you will be able to carry out this assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h.

In this way the conditional presents a clear either-or (A or B) critical characterization of the situation from the sender’s point of view as formed from its explicit and implied alternatives, alternatives which seem entirely in accord with the general critical thrust of the letter. By contrast neither the C nor the D inferences are suitable in context (assuming this sense of the conditional as a whole):

- C: if your assignments are not too much for you, you will not be able to carry out this assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h.
 D: if your assignments are too much for you, you will be able to carry out this assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h.

In table form:

	Antecedent	Consequent
A	[your assignments too much for you]	[you not able to carry out this one]
B	[your assignments not too much for you]	[you able to carry out this one]
C	[your assignments not too much for you]	[you not able to carry out this one]
D	[your assignments too much for you]	[you able to carry out this one]

Tab. 11. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pBiblNat 198III vs., ll. 3-4

²¹ For example, see recently D. Sweeney, *Correspondence and Dialogue*, p. 224-225 (ex. 76).

²² So E.F. Wente, *Letters from Ancient Egypt (WAW 1)*, 1990, p. 173 (no. 288) as against his earlier treatment (with ‘accomplish’) in E.F. Wente, *Late Ramesside Letters (SAOC 33)*, 1967, p. 82.

²³ Notice that taking *šm m* to mean “get out of” brings about a concessive reading of the conditional and thus IPO inferences (so the C reading becomes acceptable with inclusive reading of the polarity options for the antecedent: “even if your assignments are not too much for you, you will not get out of this assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h.”, i.e. you will have to do it in any case).

6. CONCLUSION

Through concentrating primarily on conditional examples displaying the negative third future, I hope to have elucidated some of the properties of these conditionals, particularly in terms of how considering implicated obversion and alternates can enrich our reading and understanding of these examples in context and how that reading can be made explicit. In particular, I have pointed to the consistency of implicated full obversion inferencing (IFO: the B implication here) or implicated partial obversion inferencing (IPO: the C implication here) as an important means of pragmatically enriching the reading of conditionals in context.